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Introduction
In a seminal paper, Choo and Siow (2006) introduced an empirically tractable methodology to study two-sided matching models with perfectly transferable utility and heterogeneity in tastes, also known as TU matching models. The key feature of this methodology is that it recasts TU models as a set of two-sided discrete choice problems. This allows the analyst to apply tools from discrete choice random utility models to estimate preferences using a single cross-section of data. Following this breakthrough, a fast growing literature has estimated marital preferences using a wide range of attributes such as education, BMI, personality traits etc., see e.g. Choo The marital preferences estimated by this method are, by construction, consistent with the marital patterns observed in the data: the estimated marital surplus is larger for types of couples that are more prevalent in the data once demographics have been accounted for. Realized marital choices of individuals are taken as input and the marital surplus which rationalizes these choices is inferred. Yet, little is known about whether these estimates of marital preferences provide valuable information about spouses' well-being or marital stability.
The aim of this paper is to provide a first assessment of the empirical content of marital preferences as estimated using TU matching models. Our approach consists of comparing marital surplus estimates with measures of subjective well-being and separation. To this aim, we first use the 2005 wave of the German SOcio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and a parametric version of the Choo and Siow (2006) model to estimate couples' marital surplus. Second, we investigate the extent to which the estimated marital surplus is associated with measures of subjective satisfaction and, using later waves of data, the probability of separation.
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The Choo and Siow Model
Consider a two-sided one-to-one matching model with transferable utility. Men and women, who aim at forming a heterosexual pair, are heterogenous and we denote x i ∈ X (y j ∈ Y) the observed type of a (wo)man i (j). Individuals have the option to remain single which is accounted for by including 0 in individuals' choice set, i.e.
(wo)men can choose a partner among set Y 0 = Y∪ {0} (X 0 = X ∪ {0}). There is a mass n x (m y ) of (wo)men of type x (y). We assume a large market so that there is a large mass of agents of each type in the market.
A couple formed of a man i of type x and a woman j of type y derives a joint
where ε iy (η xj ) is the idiosyncratic preference of (wo)man i (j) for a (wo)man of type y (x), assumed to be i.i.d. distributed across individuals and following a (0, 1) −Gumbel type I distribution.
2 Utility being transferable, the joint surplus Φ xy is shared among spouses, the husband getting U xy , the wife V xy = Φ xy − U xy .
Men and women maximize their utility. A (wo)man i (j) of type x (y) hence solves (2.1)
where u i (v j ) are the payoffs of (wo)man i (j).
Given U (V ), the optimal solutions to programs 2.1 generate conditional distributions of (wo)men of type x (y) marrying type y (x) (wo)men, say µ y|x and µ x|y respectively. It follows that:
1 Without loss of generality, the systematic utility of remaining single for agents of each type is normalized to 0, which allows us to use the term surplus rather than utility for married agents.
2 Galichon and Salanie (2017) have shown that the methodology can be extended to more general distributional assumptions. and payoffs (u, v) such that solutions to utility maximization (program 2.1) generate
where µ xy ≥ 0 is the mass of couples of type (x, y) and
is the set of feasible matchings.
A well-known result by Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) and Shapley and Shubik (1971) states that there exists an equilibrium outcome, which is i) unique in large markets (Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame, 1992; Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame, 1999), ii)
Pareto optimal and iii) pairwise stable.
Denoting G x (U x. ) the expected indirect utility of a man of type x, one has
with a similar expression for women. It follows that an application of the DalyZachary-Williams theorem yields a logit structure so that one uncovers expressions of U and V in terms of the matching as The age selection is standard in this literature and changes in the selection did not alter the main conclusion of our analysis. 4 See the online appendix A for more details about the construction of these variables as well as for some descriptive statistics. with the convention that the last element is a constant.
We assume the surplus function is linear in parameters and reads as the sum of three terms:
, λ 0 } is the vector of parameters to be estimated. The last term is a constant, the second indicates the main contribution of the attributes of both the husband and the wife and takes the form of a polynomial of order 3, while the first term indicates the contribution of the interaction between husband's and wife's attributes. 6 All attributes are standardized to facilitate comparison between coefficients without loss of generality.
Following Galichon and Salanie (2017), we use a matching moment estimator which consists in finding parameter λ such that the observed co-moments are equal to the predicted ones, that is, for instance for the term
where the observed matchingμ is computed from the data and the equilibrium matching given parameter λ, µ λ , is computed using Galichon, Kominers and Weber (2015)'s IPFP Algorithm.
We then use the estimated parameters λ and the resulting equilibrium matching 
. The larger this term, the more unequally the surplus is shared between spouses.
3.3. Results. Our estimates of preference parameters show standard features. The interactions between spouses' characteristics (λ kl ) kl are negative for all k = l, suggesting that like attracts like on age, education, subjective health, attitude towards risk, height, BMI and the big 5 personality traits. The magnitude of these interactions is larger for age and education. Lastly, for each k and l = k, λ kk > λ kl .
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We now evaluate the extent to which the marital surplus Φ λ x h y h and how it is shared
correlate with measures of well-being and separation. Table 1 presents these correlations for a selected number of variables. Results show that a higher marital surplus is significantly associated with a lower probability of becoming separated by 2016, a higher probability of having children and a more equal subjective life satisfaction between the two spouses. However, we also find that the marital surplus is not correlated with own life satisfaction or household's total life satisfaction although it does correlate significantly and positively with women's satisfaction with household income. Regarding our measure of how the surplus is shared, we find that
unequal sharing is not significantly associated with separation. However, it is negatively and significantly associated with households' total subjective life satisfaction and positively and significantly associated with the spouses' gap in subjective life satisfaction. Moreover, the more unequally the estimated marital surplus is shared among spouses, the lower the individual spouse's subjective life satisfaction (with life and with household's income), and for men, the higher their degree of pessimism towards the future.
Finally, interestingly enough, our results show that a higher marital surplus is also associated with a higher probability that spouses agree on the fact that the husband has the last word in the household's financial decisions and a higher probability that each spouse attends church. The more unequally the estimated marital surplus is shared among spouses, the lower spouse's church attendance. We interpret these results as an indication that couples with higher marital surplus tend to be more traditional in their gender roles and that couples with higher and more equally shared marital surplus have a stronger attachment to the "institution of marriage" which, in
Germany, is mainly church-based. Further research could investigate the mechanisms behind these associations.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to provide a first assessment of the empirical content of marital preferences, estimated using Choo and Siow (2006)'s methodology. Our results show that the estimated marital surplus and its (unequal) sharing among spouses is significantly associated with many variables of subjective well-being and with marial dissolution, with the intuitively expected signs. We take our results as providing further empirical validation of the Choo and Siow methodology and its extensions recently proposed in the literature. Finally, this note suggests that more insights could be gained by extending the present static framework to the dynamic case, although this is left for future research. 
xhyh ; a dummy indicating whether there are children in the household; the log of gross household income; a set of four dummies indicating whether the final word regarding financial decisions goes to the man, the woman, both or if they disagree on who has the last word; the sum of the partners' subjective life satisfaction and the absolute value of the difference in subjective life satisfaction. At the individual level (men and women), we use the following variables: subjective satisfaction with life; subjective satisfaction with household income; a subjective measure of pessimistic attitude towards the future; and a dummy indicating whether the individual goes to church. Appendix A provides a more complete description of the data used to estimate marital surplus as well as descriptive statistics. Appendix B discusses the various parametric specifications of the surplus that were tested and appendix C provides parameter estimates for our preferred specification. Table 3 provides a summary of these specifications. We are agnostic about which model is best to bring to the data. We make use of the marriage patterns predicted by each specification to compute a likelihood which is reported in the last column of Table 3 . Obviously, increasing P improves the fit of the model but since some coefficients λ 3 k and λ 3 l are significantly different from 0 we set P = 3. The most drastic improvement in the fit of the model however is obtained by choosing the absolute value of the difference in characteristics rather than the product to describe the interaction between men's and women's traits. Therefore, our preferred specification for the remainder of the paper will be specification 6.
Appendix C. Estimates
The estimates of preference parameters capturing the interaction between spouses' characteristics (λ kl ) kl are reported in table 4. Three familiar patterns appear at first glance. First, all the diagonal entries of the matrix are negative, suggesting that like attracts like. Second, consistent with previous studies, the coefficients of age (−4.23) and education (−1.71) stand out: with the coefficient of age being 2.5 times larger than that of education, which itself is twice as large as the third largest coefficient (−0.8 for the interaction of risk attitude). Third, for all eleven characteristics, the coefficient on the diagonal dominates off-diagonal entries (in magnitude). All variables are normalized, therefore the entries in the matrix are comparable with each other.
